August 31, 2026: The Iran war won’t end until the religious dictatorship and its IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) defenders are no longer operational. The Americans have been maintaining a blockade and putting diplomatic and military pressure on those who assist Iran in switching to land routes and the Caspian Sea to maintain some import activity. The blockade has reduced oil exports to less than 100,000 barrels a day. China is the primary customer for Iranian oil and is complaining openly to the United States and privately to Iran about this. China is being told the blockade will continue until Iran surrenders and that oil is available from other suppliers, including the United States. The Chinese had warned Iran that their aggressive foreign policy would eventually cause them a lot of harm, and now that has come to pass.

Inside Iran, the decades-old Israeli Mossad operatives network continues to function despite the arrests of hundreds of suspected foreign spies. The Iranian government has been trying to destroy this network for decades, without success. Most network members are Iranians who want to overthrow the religious dictatorship and bring back democracy and a functioning economy. The Ayatollahs, the IRGC, and their Basij militia are suffering because of the blockade. The Ayatollahs and their extended families are getting by, although only one Ayatollah is still alive. The IRGC and their families amount to over half a million people who expect to be well fed and otherwise taken care of. The Basij and their families amount to another half million entitled defenders of the dictatorship. Most Iranians resent these privileges but feel it would be counterproductive to fight back without access to weapons. The Americans have tried to arm some Iranian civilians, but the progress of this effort is kept secret.

The longer the blockade goes on, the more intense the pressure on the Ayatollahs and their armed minions gets. The Ayatollahs and their followers know that most Iranians want them gone, preferably dead and gone. Then there is the internal communications situation. Iranians have been under an internet blackout for nearly six months, with connectivity flatlining at less than two percent of normal levels. Restrictions on global network access continue to hinder online commerce, payment systems, and digitally dependent sectors of the economy.

In early January, after nearly two weeks of protests in Iran, government leaders enacted an internet blackout. The capital experienced extensive telephone and internet blackouts, with additional disruptions reported in Isfahan, Lordegan, Abadan, parts of Shiraz, and Kermanshah. CyberWar specialists reported that Iran's National Information Network was also fully disconnected, even internally within Iran.

Although the blackout had eased by 28 January, severe limitations remained. The Iranian Minister of Communications recognized that the shutdown was costing the economy $35.7 million a day. In April, another official estimated the direct cost of the shutdown at $30-40 million per day, and said adding indirect costs brings the true impact closer to $70-80 million per day. That means the total cost so far is over $13 billion.

That means online sales fell by 80 percent during the Internet shutdown, while the Tehran Stock Exchange overall index lost 450,000 points over a four-day period, and $1,677,000,000. In January 2026, the number of financial transactions in Iran had dropped by 185 million. This has only gotten worse since then.

The Internet blackout, which initially did not affect satellite internet connections like Starlink, has expanded into efforts to shut down Starlink, along with operations to seize satellite dishes to hinder Internet access. The Internet blackout has been described as an attempt by the government to cover up the 2026 Iran massacres.

As of 16 February, internet traffic in Iran had been reduced by half. At the same time, internet prices increased by 18 percent, bringing the total increase to 52 percent.

Following the 28 February Israeli American attacks on Iran, there was a renewed nationwide internet blackout in Iran, as Western internet experts reported internet connectivity in Iran dropping to 4 percent of the usual activity of ordinary levels. Iranians abroad said they could not communicate with relatives in Iran or connect to the Iranian intranet. In early March, internet traffic was calculated at about one percent of the usual connectivity.

By late August, the shutdown had been underway for six months, making it the longest national internet disruption recorded worldwide. Iranian technicians began restoring internet access to elite users, while most of the population remained without access. As of mid-April, the shutdown was projected to have cost the economy $1.8 billion. Internet connectivity remained extremely limited, restricting access to independent information sources. In the second week of April, Iranian internet experts admitted that there was no firm schedule for reinstating the internet.

Back in February, Iran emerged from its self-imposed internet blackout that was used as part of an effort to curb anti-government protests. That January 8-28 blackout was more extreme than any nation had ever endured. Mobile networks, text messaging services, and landlines were disabled, and Starlink was blocked. When a few domestic services became available, the government removed specific social features, such as comment sections on news sites and chat boxes in online marketplaces.

What remained operational, at least for a while, was the government-controlled and monitored national Intranet. This system was available only inside Iran, and users could not contact anyone outside Iran without government permission and monitoring. The current system prevents Iranians from using VPNs or special SIM cards for phones to communicate. Chat functions in nonpolitical apps like ridesharing or shopping platforms are also blocked. Any channel that allows two people to exchange text is seen as a threat. Then there was shortwave radio, which has limited range and

The Iranian government has its priorities, and information control is more important than a functioning economy, growing poverty, and the ability of Iranians to assemble to protest government policies or use the internet to discuss these problems with other Iranians or the outside world.

All this suppression came under attack at the end of February when the United States, Israel, and a few other nations declared war on Iran. If the current Iranian government collapses, the attacking coalition should promise to promptly restore internet and messaging services throughout the country. Many Iranians have discovered that the internet is something worth fighting and dying for. A post-war Iranian communications net could also benefit from adding technologies that are harder to whitelist or block, such as mesh networks and D2C/Direct 2 Consumer technologies that bypass the choke points of state-controlled ISPs/Internet Service Providers.